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ABSTRACTS

Mary lane Plumer*
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-LIABILITY OF ORIGINAL WRONGDOER
WHERE AcTS OF THIRD PERSO;NS INTERVENED-Plaintiff sues for damages
for injuries to and death of her husband, Perez, resulting from being shot by
defendant and two policemen. Defendant had announced an intention to commit suicide and had senti for Perez to consult with him in reference to the settlement of his affairs. Perez and one Cain, who accompanied hiµi, being convinced that defendant actually intended to commit suicide, agreed that Perez
should stay with defendant to dissuade him while Cain, without defendant's
knowledge, went for the police. Cain returned with two police officers who
entered the building in time to hear a shot and see Perez run into another room.
The officers opened fire and Pere~ died of gunshot wounds. Plaintiff alleges
that her husband's death proximately resulted from the deliberate and wanton
act of defendant "which amounts to gross carelessness and criminal negligence."
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a nonsuit and on appeal the
court of appeals held, affirmed. In the words of the lower court " ... the negligent acts of the policemen in doing bodily harm to Perez was not the natural
consequence of the act of Carbery [ Carbrey], the defendant, and could not
possibly have been anticipated by him since he didn't know of their presence at
the time of the awful tragedy." 1 Perez v. Carbrey, {La. App. 1945) 22 S.

{2d) 76.
EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY OF TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WHEN TESTIMONY MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF SAME WITNESS CONCERNING SAME TRANSACTION IN D~FFERENT CASE-Plaintiff brought this action
for damages for personal injuries s~stained while riding as a guest in the automobile driven by defendant, Jane Shumacher, and owned by defendant, William
Ruess. Plaintiff testified that she had warned Jane Schumacher of the approach
of another car from the east when defendant's car was 185 to 190 feet north of
the north side of the intersection. In cross-:-examination it came out that in a
previous action growing out of the same accident, brought against defendants by
the administratrix of an occupant of the other car, plaintiff had testified that defendant's car had been just 15 feet from the intersection when she saw the other
car approaching, and that the other car was 25 or 30 feet from the intersection
at that time and was traveling at a rate of 70 or 7 5 mile~ per hour. When asked
about the previous testimony, plaintiff said only that she didn't remember. When
plaintiff's evidence was in, defendant moved for a directed verdict and the motion was granted. On appeal, held, affirmed., "The convenient loss of memory
to escape the fatal effect of positive sworn testimony on the one hand, and an

* Managing Editor, M1cH. L. REv.
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Principal case at 383.
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amazing resurrection of memory more than two years later as facts and incidents
tending to make a case, make the evidence incredible as a matter of law in the
absence of any reasonable explanation of the conflict. The trial court is not required to sit by and permit a litigant to play fast and loose with the processes
of the court by insisting at different times under oath on the truth of each of two
contradictory stories according to exigencies of the particular occasion presenting itself." 1 Gohlinghorst v. Ruess, (Neb. 1945) 20 N.W. (2d) 381.2
FUTURE INTERESTS-RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION-RESTRAINT ON SALE
TO AND UsE BY MEMBERS OF A PARTICULAR RACE-An agreement under
seal recorded in the land records of the District of Columbia, between the owners of residence property in a block on First Street in the City of Washington,
purports to bind the signers, their heirs and assigns, in an agreement that no
Negro shall use or acquire title to any property in the block for twenty-one years
from September 1, 1925, which was the date of the agreement. Mays, appellant
here, is an American citizen of Negro blood who has purchased real estate covered by the restrictive agreement. From a decision of the district court setting
aside the deed to Mays, she appeals, claiming that the covenant constitutes an
undue and unlawful restraint on alienation. Held, affirmed. Although there are
cases to the contrary, the weight of authority is that: "Conditions which prohibit its [property's] alienation to a particular person or for a limited period, or
its subjection to particular uses, are not subversive of the estate: they do not destroy or limit its alienable or inheritable character." 1 The present restriction
comes within this classification. 2 Mays v. Burgess. (App. D.C. 1945) 147 F.
(2d) 869.8
1
2
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Quoted, principal case at 78.
See 5 A.L.R. 1505 (1920).

Principal case at 872. The com;t adopted this language from the opinion in
· Crowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 at 57 (1879).
2
Cert. den., 325 U.S. 868, 65 S.Ct. 1046 (1945), rehearing den., 325 U.S. 896,
65 S. Ct. 1567 (1945).
8 Associate Justice Edgerton dissented on several grounds: (1) the character of the
neighborhood had so changed that the original purpose was no longer enforceable; (2)
no benefit could be conferred by setting aside the deed that was "commensurate" with
the extreme hardship on appellant; (3) there was not privity of contract since appellants were not parties to the agreement; (4) such a restriction is void as against public
policy.
In Gospel Spreading Assoc., Inc., (App. D.C. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 878, the facts
were similar except that there, there had been colored penetration in the neighborhood
into numerous houses covered by the restriction. The court there reversed the district
court's holding in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that such a holding would not
carry out the purpose of the restriction.
For discussions of this problem see: Kahen, "Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive
Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem," 12 Umv. CHI. L. REv. 198 (1945);
Miller, "Race Restrictions on the Use or Sale of Real Property," 2 NAT. B. J. 24
(1944); 3 NAT. B. J. 50 (1945}; 9 A.L.R. 120 (1920); 66 A.L.R. 531 (1930);
II4 A.L.R. 1237 (1938).
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JoINT ToRTFEASORs-JoINT LIABILITY oF INDEPENDENT ToRTFEASORs
-In an action for damages against two defendants plaintiff sought to prove that
the injury complained of was incurred when the car of one defendant struck his
bicycle as he was making a left turn and knocked it into the path of the car
of the second defendant which ran over him. The jury found as a fact that both
defendants -were negligent and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Defendants contend on appeal that there were distinct and separate acts and circumstances on the part of each defendant, that they were not acting in concert,
that they did not unite to bring about a single injury, and that each was liable for
his own tort and the damage caused and no more. Held, affirmed. "Under
circumstances like those before us, the last as well as the first and intermediate
~ortfeasors are liable for all tort damages sustained by the plaintiff, independent
of any showing of the actual damages inflicted by the respective tortfeasors."
Osinski 11. Benson, (Ill. 1944) 56 N.E. (2d) 665. 1
TRIAL. PRACTICE-EFFECT OF TENDER AS AN ADMISSION AND AS BASIS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-In an action for damages for breach of a
contract of employment defendant alleged in his answer (I) that the action was
premature, and (2) that on the date when the money became due under the
contract ( some time after the action was begun) defendant had tendered and
upon plaintiff's refusal to accept, paid into court, a sum which he admitted to be
due, plus court costs up to that time. Plaintiff moved for a partial summary
judgment for the amount paid ~nto court, less the court costs. From an order
granting plaintiff's motion, defendant appeals. Held, affirmed. An application
for partial summary judgment under rule I 14 of the New York Rules of Civil
Procedure must be supported by proof that part of plaintiff's claim is admitted.
Since under the Civil Practice Act,1 defendant still has a right to defend the action ff plaintiff fails to accept the tender, it may be inferred that "payment into
court is not an admission of the plaintiff's cause of action, at least if the answer
denies the plaintiff's asserted right to recover. . . ." 2 However, in this case
there was an admission in the pleadings and in affidavits submitted by defendant,
and although defendant may have a complete defense to the cause of action declared upon, plaintiff is entitled to a partial summary judgment "where there is
an unqualified admission that there is due to the plaintiff a precise sum ... upon
the same transaction for!lling the basis of the plaintiff's claim, although the admission of liability is predicated upon a cause of action different from that alleged in the complaint. . . ." 8 Fleder v. Itkin, 294 N.Y. 83, 60 N.E. (2d)
753 (1945).
1 On joint liability of in-dependent tortfeasors see annotations in 9 A.L.R. 939
(1920), 35 A.L.R. 409 (1925), 91 A.L.R. 759 (1934).

N.Y. Civil Practice Act, § 173.
Principal case at 83 .
• 3 The Court adopted the language, quoted at 84, of Mr. Justice Shientag in Sheehan v. Andrew Cone General Advertising Agency, Inc., 176 Misc. 882 at 884,
29 N.Y.S. (2d) 317 (1941).
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